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Abstract
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans
do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative
behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the
material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach
to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass (2013) call translu-
cent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that a
deviation by one player does not affect the strategies used by other players.
But a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another,
the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For
example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may
sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can re-
cover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied
games such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma, Bertrand Competi-
tion, and the Public Goods game.
1 Introduction
In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not al-
ways behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Many alternative models have
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consequently been proposed to explain deviations from the money-maximization
paradigm. Some of them assume that players are boundedly rational and/or make
mistakes in the computation of the expected utility of a strategy (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004;
Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta 2001; Halpern and Pass 2014; McKelvey and Palfrey 1995;
Stahl and Wilson 1994); yet others assume that players have other-regarding pref-
erences (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999);
others define radically different solution concepts, assuming that players do not try
to maximize their payoff, but rather try to minimize their regret (Halpern and Pass 2012;
Renou and Schlag 2010), or maximize the forecasts associated to coalition struc-
tures (Capraro 2013; Capraro, Venanzi, Polukarov, and Jennings 2013), or maxi-
mize the total welfare (Apt and Scha¨fer 2014; Rong and Halpern 2013). (These
references only scratch the surface; a complete bibliography would be longer than
this paper!)
Cooperative behaviour in one-shot anonymous games is particularly puzzling,
especially in games where non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to
the material payoffs): why should you pay a cost to help a stranger, when no clear
direct or indirect reward seems to be at stake? Nevertheless, the secret of success
of our societies is largely due to our ability to cooperate. We do not cooperate only
with family members, friends, and co-workers. A great deal of cooperation can be
observed also in one-shot anonymous interactions (Camerer 2003), where none of
the five rules of cooperation proposed by Nowak (2006) seems to be at play.
Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, based on work of
Halpern and Pass (2013) and Salcedo (2013), assuming what Halpern and Pass call
translucent players. Typically, players are assumed to be opaque, in the sense that
a deviation by one player does not affect the strategies used by other players. But a
player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he
chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses
to defect in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. (Indeed, it
is well known that there are facial and bodily clues, such as increased pupil size,
associated with deception; see, e.g., (Ekman and Friesen 1969). Professional poker
players are also very sensitive to tells—betting patterns and physical demeanor that
reveal something about a player’s hand and strategy.)
We use the idea of translucency to explain cooperation. This may at first seem
somewhat strange. Typical lab experiments of social dilemmas consider anony-
mous players, who play each other over computers. In this setting, there are no
tells. However, as Rand and his colleagues have argued (see, e.g., (Rand et al. 2012;
Rand et al. 2014)), behavior of subjects in lab experiments is strongly influenced
by their experience in everyday interactions. People internalize strategies that are
more successful in everyday interactions and use them as default strategies in the
lab. We would argue that people do not just internalize strategies; they also inter-
2
nalize beliefs. In everyday interactions, changing strategies certainly affects how
other players react in the future. Through tells and leaks, it also may affect how
other players react in current play. Thus, we would argue that in everyday interac-
tions, people assume a certain amount of translucency, both because it is a way of
taking the future into account in real-world situations that are repeated and because
it is a realistic assumption in one-shot games that are played in settings where play-
ers have a great deal of social interaction. We claim that players then apply these
beliefs in lab settings where they are arguably inappropriate.
There is some additional experimental evidence that can be viewed as support-
ing translucency. There is growing evidence that showing people simple images of
watching eyes has a marked effect on behavior, ranging from giving more in Public
Goods games to littering less (see (Bateson et al. 2013) for a discussion of some
of this work and an extensive list of references). One way of understanding these
results is that the eyes are making people feel more translucent.
We apply the idea of translucency to a particular class of games that we call
social dilemmas (cf. (Dawes 1980)). A social dilemma is a normal-form game with
two properties:
1. there is a unique Nash equilibrium sN , which is a pure strategy profile;
2. there is a unique welfare-maximizing profile sW , again a pure strategy pro-
file, such that each player’s utility if sW is played is higher than his utility if
sN is played.
Although social dilemmas are clearly a restricted class of games, they contain
some of the best-studied games in the game theory literature, including Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Traveler’s Dilemma (Basu 1994), Bertrand Competition, and the Public
Goods game. (See Section 3 for more discussion of these games.)
There are (at least) two reasons why an agent may be concerned about translu-
cency in a social dilemma: (1) his opponents may discover that he is planning to
defect and punish him by defecting as well, (2) many other people in his social
group (which may or may not include his opponent) may discover that he is plan-
ning to defect (or has defected, despite the fact that the game is anonymous) and
think worse of him.
For definiteness, we focus here on the first point and assume that, in social
dilemmas, players have a degree of belief α that they are translucent, so that if they
intend to cooperate (by playing their component of the welfare-maximizing strat-
egy) and decide to deviate, there is a probability α that another player will detect
this, and play her component of the Nash equilibrium strategy. (These detections
are independent, so that the probability of, for example, exactly two players other
than i detecting a deviation by i is α2(1 − α)N−3, where N is the total number
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of players.) Of course, if α = 0, then we are back at the standard game-theoretic
framework. We show that, with this assumption, we can already explain a number
of experimental regularities observed in social dilemmas (see Section 3). We can
model the second point regarding concerns about translucency in much the same
way, and would get qualitatively similar results (see Section 5).
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we formalize the notion of
translucency in a game-theoretic setting. In Section 3, we define the social dilem-
mas that we focus on in this paper; in Section 4, we show that by assuming translu-
cency, we can obtain as predictions of the framework a number of regularities that
have been observed in the experimental literature. In Section 5, we show that most
of the other approaches proposed for explaining human behavior in social dilem-
mas do not predict all these regularities.
In the appendix, we discuss a solution concept that we call translucent equilib-
rium, based on translucency, closely related to the notion of individual rationality
discussed by Halpern and Pass (2013), and show how it can be applied in social
dilemmas.
2 Rationality with translucent players
In this section, we briefly define rationality in the presence of translucency, moti-
vated by the ideas in Halpern and Pass (2013).
Formally, a (finite) normal-form game G is a tuple (P, S1, . . . , SN , u1, . . . , uN ),
where P = {1, . . . , N} is the set of players, Si is the set of strategies for player i,
and ui is player i’s utility function. Let S = S1 × · · · × SN and S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj .
We assume that S is finite and that N ≥ 2.
In standard game theory, it is assumed that a player i has beliefs about the
strategies being used by other players; i is rational if his strategy is a best response
to these beliefs. The standard definition of best response is the following.
Definition 2.1. A strategy si ∈ Si is a best response to a probability µi on S−i if,
for all strategies s′i for player i, we have∑
s′
−i∈S−i
µi(s
′
−i)ui(si, s
′
−i) ≥
∑
s′
−i∈S−i
µi(s
′
−i)ui(s
′
i, s
′
−i).
Definition 2.1 implicitly assumes that i’s beliefs about what other agents are
doing do not change if i switches from si, the strategy he was intending to play, to a
different strategy. (In general, we assume that i always has an intended strategy, for
otherwise it does not make sense to talk about i switching to a different strategy.)
So what we really have are beliefs µsi,s
′
i
i for i indexed by a pair of strategies si and
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s′i; we interpret µ
si,s
′
i
i as i’s beliefs if he intends to play si but instead deviates to
s′i. Thus, µ
si,si
i represents i’s beliefs if he plays si and does not deviate.
We can now define a best response for i with respect to a family of beliefs
µ
si,s
′
i
i .
Definition 2.2. Strategy si ∈ Si is a best response for i with respect to the beliefs
{µ
si,s
′
i
i : s
′
i ∈ Si} if, for all strategies s′i ∈ Si, we have∑
s′
−i∈S−i
µsi,sii (s
′
−i)ui(si, s
′
−i) ≥
∑
s′
−i∈S−i
µ
si,s
′
i
i (s
′
−i)ui(s
′
i, s
′
−i).
We are interested in players who are making best responses to their beliefs, but
we define best response in terms of Definition 2.2, not Definition 2.1. Of course,
the standard notion of best response is just the special case of the notion above
where µsi,s
′
i
i = µ
si,si
i for all s′i: a player’s beliefs about what other players are
doing does not change if he switches strategies.
Definition 2.3. We say that a player is translucently rational if he best responds to
his beliefs in the sense of Definition 2.2.
Our assumptions about translucency will be used to determine µsi,s
′
i
i . For ex-
ample, suppose that Γ is a 2-player game, player 1 believes that, if he were to
switch from si to s′i, this would be detected by player 2 with probability α, and
if player 2 did detect the switch, then player 2 would switch to s′j . Then µ
si,s
′
i
i is
(1− α)µsi,si + αµ′, where µ′ assigns probability 1 to s′j ; that is, player 1 believes
that with probability 1 − α, player 2 continues to do what he would have done all
along (as described by µsi,si) and, with probability α, player 2 switches to s′j .
3 Social dilemmas
Social dilemmas are situations in which there is a tension between the collective
interest and individual interests: every individual has an incentive to deviate from
the common good and act selfishly, but if everyone deviates, then they are all worse
off. Personal and professional relationships, depletion of natural resources, climate
protection, security of energy supply, and price competition in markets are all in-
stances of social dilemmas.
As we said in the introduction, we formally define a social dilemma as a
normal-form game with a unique Nash equilibrium and a unique welfare-maximizing
profile, both pure strategy profiles, such that each player’s utility if sW is played is
higher than his utility if sN is played. While this is a quite restricted set of games,
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it includes many that have been quite well studied. Here, we focus on the following
games:
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Two players can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). To
relate our results to experimental results on Prisoner’s Dilemma, we think of
cooperation as meaning that a player pays a cost c > 0 to give a benefit b > c
to the other player. If a player defects, he pays nothing and gives nothing.
Thus, the payoff of (D,D) is (0, 0), the payoff of (C,C) is (b − c, b − c),
and the payoffs of (D,C) and (C,D) are (b,−c) and (−c, b), respectively.
Condition b > c implies that (D,D) is the unique Nash equilibrium and
(C,C) is the unique welfare-maximizing profile.
Public Goods game. N ≥ 2 contributors are endowed with 1 dollar each; they
must simultaneously decide how much, if anything, to contribute to a public
pool. (The contributions must be in whole cent amounts.) The total amount
in the pot is then multiplied by a constant strictly between 1 and N , and
then evenly redistributed among all players. So the payoff of player i is
ui(x1, . . . , xN ) = 1− xi + ρ(x1 + . . . + xN ), where xi denotes i’s contri-
bution, and ρ ∈
(
1
N
, 1
)
is the marginal return. (Thus, the pool is multiplied
by ρN before being split evenly among all players.) Everyone contributing
nothing to the pool is the unique Nash equilibrium, and everyone contribut-
ing their whole endowment to the pool is the unique welfare-maximizing
profile.
Bertrand Competition. N ≥ 2 firms compete to sell their identical product at a
price between the “price floor” L ≥ 2 and the “reservation value”H . (Again,
we assume that H and L are integers, and all prices must be integers.) The
firm that chooses the lowest price, say s, sells the product at that price, get-
ting a payoff of s, while all other firms get a payoff of 0. If there are ties, then
the sales are split equally among all firms that choose the lowest price. Now
everyone choosing L is the unique Nash equilibrium, and everyone choosing
H is the unique welfare-maximizing profile.1
Traveler’s Dilemma. Two travelers have identical luggage, which is damaged (in
an identical way) by an airline. The airline offers to recompense them for
their luggage. They may ask for any dollar amount between L and H (where
L and H are both positive integers). There is only one catch. If they ask for
the same amount, then that is what they will both receive. However, if they
1We require that L ≥ 2 for otherwise we would not have a unique Nash equilibrium, a condition
we imposed on Social Dilemmas. If L = 1 and N = 2, we get two Nash equilibria: (2, 2) and
(1, 1); similarly, for L = 0, we also get multiple Nash equilibria, for all values of N ≥ 2.
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ask for different amounts—say one asks for m and the other for m′, with
m < m′—then whoever asks for m (the lower amount) will get m + b (m
and a bonus of b), while the other player gets m− b: the lower amount and
a penalty of b. It is easy to see that (L,L) is the unique Nash equilibrium,
while (H,H) maximizes social welfare, independent of b.
From here on, we say that a player cooperates if he plays his part of the
socially-welfare maximizing strategy profile and defects if he plays his part of the
Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
While Nash equilibrium predicts that people should always defect in social
dilemmas, in practice, we see a great deal of cooperative behavior; that is, people
often play (their part of) the welfare-maximizing profile rather than (their part of)
the Nash equilibrium profile. Of course, there have been many attempts to explain
this. Evolutionary theories may explain cooperative behavior among genetically re-
lated individuals (Hamilton 1964) or when future interactions among the same sub-
jects are likely (Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Trivers 1971); see (Nowak 2006) for
a review of the five rules of cooperation. However, we often observe cooperation
even in one-shot anonymous experiments among unrelated players (Rapoport 1965).
Although we do see a great deal of cooperation in these games, we do not
always see it. Here are some of the regularities that have been observed:
• The degree of cooperation in the Prisoner’s dilemma depends positively on
the benefit of mutual cooperation and negatively on the cost of cooperation
(Capraro, Jordan, and Rand 2014; Engel and Zhurakhovska 2012; Rapoport 1965).
• The degree of cooperation in the Traveler’s Dilemma depends negatively on
the bonus/penalty (Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt 1999).
• The degree of cooperation in the Public Goods game depends positively on
the constant marginal return (Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, and McCabe 2007;
Isaac, Walker, and Thomas 1984).
• The degree of cooperation in the Public Goods game depends positively on
the number of players (Barcelo and Capraro 2014; Isaac, Walker, and Williams 1994;
Zelmer 2003).
• The degree of cooperation in the Bertrand Competition depends negatively
on the number of players (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2002).
• The degree of cooperation in the Bertrand Competition depends negatively
on the price floor (Dufwenberg, Gneezy, Goeree, and Nagel 2007).
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4 Explaining social dilemmas using translucency
As we suggested in the introduction, we hope to use translucency to explain co-
operation in social dilemmas. To do this, we have to make assumptions about an
agent’s beliefs. Say that an agent i has type (α, β,C) if i intends to cooperate (the
parameter C stands for cooperate) and believes that (a) if he deviates from that,
then each other agent will independently realize this with probability α; (b) if an
agent j realizes that i is not going to cooperate, then j will defect; and (c) all other
players will either cooperate or defect, and they will cooperate with probability β.
The standard assumption, of course, is that α = 0. Our results are only of
interest if α > 0. The assumption that i believes that agent j will defect if she
realizes that i is going to deviate from cooperation seems reasonable; defection is
the “safe” strategy. We stress that, for our results, it does not matter what j actu-
ally does. All that matters are i’s beliefs about what j will do. The assumption
that players will either cooperate or defect is trivially true in Prisoner’s Dilemma,
but is a highly nontrivial assumption in the other games we consider. While co-
operation and defection are arguably the most salient strategies, we do in practice
see players using other strategies. For instance, the distribution of strategies in the
Public Goods game is typically tri-modal, concentrated on contributing nothing,
contributing everything, and contributing half (Capraro, Jordan, and Rand 2014).
We made this assumption mainly for technical convenience; it makes the calcula-
tions much easier. We believe that results qualitatively similar to ours will hold
under a much weaker assumption, namely, that a type (α, β,C) player believes
that other players will cooperate with probability β (without assuming that they
will defect with probability 1− β).
Similarly, the assumptions that a social dilemma has a unique Nash equilibrium
and a unique social-welfare maximizing strategy were made largely for technical
reasons. We can drop these assumptions, although that would require more com-
plicated assumptions about players’ beliefs.
The key feature of our current assumptions is that the type of player i deter-
mines the distributions µsi,s
′
i
i . In a social dilemma with N agents, the distribution
µsi,sii assigns probability βr(1 − β)N−1−r to a strategy profile s−i for the players
other than i if exactly r players cooperate in s−i and the remaining N−1−r play-
ers defect; it assigns probability 0 to all other strategy profiles. The distributions
µ
si,s
′
i
i for s′i 6= si all have the form
∑
J⊆{1,...,i−1,i+1,...,N} α
|J |(1 − α)N−1−|J |µJi ,
where µJi is the distribution that assigns probability βk(1− β)N−|J |−k to a profile
where k ≤ N − 1 − |J | players not in J cooperate, and the remaining players
(which includes all the players in J) defect. Thus, µJi is the distribution that de-
scribes what player i’s beliefs would be if he knew that exactly the players in J
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had noticed his deviation (which happens with probability α|J |(1−α)N−1−|J |). In
the remainder of this section, when we talk about best response, it is with respect
to these beliefs.
For our purposes, it does not matter where the beliefs α and β that make up a
player’s type come from. We do not assume, for example, that other players are
(translucently) rational. For example, i may believe that some players cooperate
because they are altruistic, while others may cooperate because they have mistaken
beliefs. We can think of β as summarizing i’s previous experience of cooperation
when playing social dilemmas. Here we are interested in the impact of the param-
eters of the game on the reasonableness of cooperation, given a player’s type.
The following four propositions analyze the four social dilemmas in turn. We
start with Prisoners Dilemma. Recall that b is the benefit of cooperation and c is its
cost.
Proposition 4.1. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is translucently rational for a player of
type (α, β,C) to cooperate if and only if αβb ≥ c.
Proof. If player i has type (α, β,C) and cooperates in Prisoner’s Dilemma, then
his expected payoff is β(b − c) − (1 − β)c, since player i believes that j 6= i will
cooperate with probability β. However, if i deviates from his intended strategy
of cooperation, then j will catch him with probability α and also defect. Thus,
if i deviates, then i’s belief that j will cooperate goes down from β to (1 − α)β.
(We remark that this is the case in all social dilemmas; this fact will be used in all
our arguments.) This means that i’s expected payoff if he deviates by defecting is
(1− α)βb. So cooperating is a best response if β(b− c)− (1− β)c ≥ (1− α)βb.
A little algebra shows that this reduces to αβb ≥ c.
As we would expect, if α = 0, then cooperation is not a best response in
Prisoner’s Dilemma; this is just the standard argument that defection dominates
cooperation. But if α > 0, then cooperation can be rational. Moreover, if we fix α,
the greater the benefit of cooperation and the smaller the cost, then the smaller the
value of β that still allows cooperation to be a best response.
We next consider Traveler’s Dilemma. Recall that b is the reward/punishment,
and H and L are the high and low payoffs, respectively.
Proposition 4.2. In Traveler’s Dilemma, it is translucently rational for a player of
(α, β,C) to cooperate if and only if b ≤
{ (H−L)β
1−αβ if α ≥ 12
min
(
(H−L)β
1−αβ ,
H−L−1
1−2α
)
if α < 12 ;
Proof. If player i has type (α, β,C) and cooperates in Traveler’s Dilemma, then
his expected payoff is βH + (1 − β)(L − b), since player i believes that j 6= i
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will cooperate with probability β. If i deviates and plays x 6= H , then j will catch
him with probability α and play L. Recall from the proof of Proposition 4.1 that,
if i deviates, i’s belief that j cooperates is (1 − α)β. This means that i’s expected
payoff if he deviates to x < H is (1−α)β(x+b)+(1−β+αβ)(L−b) if x > L, and
(1−α)β(L+b)+(1−β+αβ)L = L+(β−αβ)b if x = L. It is easy to see that i
maximizes his expected payoff either if x = H−1 or x = L. Thus, cooperation is a
best response if βH+(1−β)(L−b) ≥ max((1−α)β(H+b−1)+(1−β+αβ)(L−
b), L + (β − αβ)b). Again, straightforward algebra shows that this condition is
equivalent to the one stated, as desired. (It is easy to check that if α ≥ 1/2, then
the condition βH+(1−β)(L− b) ≥ (1−α)β(H + b−1)+(1−β+αβ)(L− b)
is guaranteed to hold, which is why we get the two cases depending on whether
α ≥ 1/2.)
Proposition 4.2 shows that as b, the punishment/reward, increases, a player
must have greater belief that his opponent is cooperative and/or a greater belief
that the opponent will learn about his deviation and/or a greater difference between
the high and low payoffs in order to make cooperation a best response. (The fact
that increasing β increases (H−L)β1−αβ follows from straightforward calculus.)
We next consider the Public Goods game. Recall the ρ is the marginal return
of cooperating.
Proposition 4.3. In the Public Goods game with N players, it is translucently
rational for a player of type (α, β,C) to cooperate if and only if αβρ(N − 1) ≥
1− ρ.
Proof. Suppose player i, of type (α, β,C), cooperates. Since he expects a player to
cooperate with probability β, the expected number of cooperators among the other
players is β(N − 1). Since he himself will cooperate, the total expected number
of cooperators is 1 + β(N − 1). Since i’s payoff is ρm if m players including him
cooperate, and thus is linear in the number of cooperators, his expected payoff is
exactly his payoff if the expected number of players cooperate. Since his expected
payoff with 1 + β(N − 1) cooperators is ρ(1 + β(N − 1)), this is his expected
payoff if he cooperates.
On the other hand, if i deviates by contributing x < 1, his expected payoff if
m other players cooperate is (1−x)+ρ(m+x). Again, if i deviates, his expected
belief that j will cooperate is (1−α)β. Thus, the expected number of cooperators
is (1−α)β(N − 1), and his expected payoff is 1− x+ ρ((1− α)β(N − 1) + x).
Since ρ < 1, he gets the highest expected payoff by defecting (i.e., taking x = 0).
Thus, cooperation is a best response if ρ(1+β(N−1)) ≥ 1+ρ(1−α)β(N−1).
Simple algebra shows that this condition holds iff αβρ(N − 1) ≥ 1− ρ.
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Proposition 4.3 shows that if ρ = 1, then cooperation is certainly a best re-
sponse (you always get out at least as much as you contribute). For fixed α and
β, there is guaranteed to be an N0 such that cooperation is a best response for
all N ≥ N0; moreover, for fixed α, as N gets larger, smaller and smaller βs are
needed for cooperation to be a best response.
Finally we consider the Bertrand competition. Recall that H is the reservation
value and L is the price floor.
Proposition 4.4. In Bertrand Competition, it is translucently rational for a player
of type (α, β,C) to cooperate iff βN−1 ≥ f(γ,N)LN/H , where f(γ,N) =∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
(1− γ)kγN−k−1/(k + 1) and γ = (1− α)β.
Proof. Clearly, if player i cooperates, then his expected payoff is βN−1H/N , since
he gets H/N if everyone else cooperates (which happens with probability βN−1),
and otherwise gets 0.
Let γ = (1−α)β. Again, this is the probability that i ascribes to another player
playing H if he deviates. If i deviates, then it is easy to see (given his beliefs) that
the optimal choices for deviation are H − 1 and L. In the former case,
i’s expected payoff is γN−1(H − 1). In the latter case, i’s expected payoff
is
∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
(1 − γ)kγN−k−1L/(k + 1): with probability (1 − γ)kγN−k−1,
exactly k other players will play L, and i’s payoff will be L/(k + 1). Moreover,
each possible subset of k defectors, has to be count
(
N−1
k
)
times. Let f(γ,N) =∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
(1 − γ)kγN−k−1/(k + 1). Note that, as the notation suggests, this
expression depends only on γ and N (and not any of the other parameters of the
game). Thus, i’s expected payoff in this case is f(γ,N)L, so cooperation is a
best response iff βN−1H/N ≥ max(γN−1(H − 1), f(γ,N)L). While it seems
difficult to find a closed-form expression for f(γ,N), this does not matter for our
purposes.2 Since we clearly have βN−1H/N ≥ γN−1(H−1), cooperation is a best
response iff βN−1H/N ≥ f(γ,N)L, or, equivalently, βN−1 ≥ f(γ,N)LN/H ,
Note that f(γ,N) =
∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
(1−γ)kγN−k−1/(k+1) ≥
∑N−1
k=0
(
N−1
k
)
(1−
γ)kγN−k/N = 1/N , so Proposition 4.4 shows cooperation is irrational if βN−1 <
L/H . Thus, while cooperation may be achieved for reasonable values of α and β
if N is small, a player must be more and more certain of cooperation in order to
cooperate in Bertrand Competition as the number of players increases. Indeed, for
a fixed type (α, β,C), there exists N0 such that cooperation is not a best response
for all N ≥ N0. Moreover, if we fix the number N of players, more values of α
2Note that the expected value of L/(k+1) cannot be computed by plugging in the expected value
of k, in the spirit of our earlier calculations, since L/(k + 1) is not linear in k.
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and β allow cooperation as L/H gets smaller. In particular, if we fix H and raise
the floor L, fewer values of α and β allow cooperation.
While Propositions 4.1–4.4 are suggestive, we need to make extra assumptions
to use these propositions to make predictions. A simple assumption that suffices
is that there are a substantial number of translucently rational players whose types
have the form (α, β,C), and for each pair (u, v) and (u′, v′) of open intervals
in [0, 1], there is a positive probability of finding someone of type (α, β,C) with
α ∈ (u, v) and β ∈ (u′, v′). With this assumption, it is easy to see that all the
regularities discussed in Section 3 hold.
5 Discussion
We have presented an approach that explains a number of well-known observations
regarding the extent of cooperation in social dilemmas. In addition, our approach
can also be applied to explain the apparent contradiction that people cooperate
more in a one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma when they do not know the other player’s
choice than when they do. In the latter case, Shafir and Tversky (1992) found that
most people (90%) defect, while in the former case, only 63% of people defect.
Our model of translucent players predicts this behavior: if player 1 knows player
2 choices, then there is no translucency and thus our model predicts that player 1
defects for sure. On the other hand, if player 1 does not know player 2’s choice and
believes that he is to some extent translucent, then, as shown in Proposition 4.1, he
may be willing to cooperate. Seen in this light, our model can also be interpreted
as an attempt to formalize quasi-magical thinking (Shafir and Tversky 1992), the
kind of reasoning that is supposed to motivate those people who believe that the
others’ reasoning is somehow influenced by their own thinking, even though they
know that there is no causal relation between the two. Quasi-magical thinking has
also been formalized by Masel (2007) in the context of the Public Goods gam and
by Daley and Sadowski (2014) in the context of symmetric 2×2 games. The notion
of translucency goes beyond these models, since it may applied to a much larger
set of games.
Besides a retrospective explanation, our model makes new predictions for so-
cial dilemmas which, to the best of our knowledge, have never been tested in the
lab. In particular, it predicts that
• the degree of cooperation in Traveler’s dilemma increases as the difference
H − L increases;
• for fixed L and N , the degree of cooperation in Bertrand Competition in-
creases as H increases, and what really matters is the ratio L/H .
12
Clearly much more experimental work needs to be done to validate the ap-
proach. For one thing, it is important to understand the predictions it makes for
other social dilemmas and for games that are not social dilemmas. Perhaps even
more important would be to see if we can experimentally verify that people believe
that they are to some extent translucent, and, if so, to get a sense of what the value
of α is. In light of the work on watching eyes mentioned in the introduction, it
would also be interesting to know what could be done to manipulate the value of
α.
As we mentioned, there have been many other attempts to explain cooperation
in social dilemmas, especially recently. Most of other approaches that we are aware
of are not able to obtain all the regularities that we have mentioned.
• The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity-aversion model assumes that sub-
jects play a Nash equilibrium of a modified game, in which players do
not only care about their monetary payoff, but also they care about equity.
Specifically, player i’s utility when strategy s is played is assumed to be
Ui(s) = ui(s)−
aFSi
N−1
∑
j 6=imax(uj(s)−ui(s), 0)−
bFSi
N−1
∑
j 6=imax(ui(s)−
uj(s), 0), where ui(s) is the material payoff of player i, and 0 ≤ bFSi ≤ aFSi
are individual parameters, where aFSi represents the extent to which player
i is averse to inequity in favor of others, and bFSi represents his aversion to
inequity in his favor. Consider the Public Goods game with N players. The
strategy profile (x, . . . , x), where all players contribute x gives player i a
utility of (1 − x) + ρNx. If x > 0 and player i contributes x′ < x, then his
payoff is (1−x′)+ρ((N −1)x+x′)−bFSi ρ(x−x′). Thus, (x, . . . , x) is an
equilibrium if bFSi ρ(x− x′) ≥ (1− ρ)(x− x′), that is, if bFSi ≥ (1− ρ)/ρ.
Thus, if bFSi ≥ (1− ρ)/ρ for all players i, then (x, . . . , x) is an equilibrium
for all choices of x and all values of N . While there may be other pure and
mixed strategy equilibria, it is not hard to show that if bFSi < (1−ρ)/ρ, then
player i will play 0 in every equilibrium (i.e., not contribute anything). As a
consequence, assuming, as in our model, that players believe that there is a
probability β that other agents will cooperate and that the other agents either
cooperate or defect, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model does not make any clear
prediction of a group-size effect on cooperation in the public goods game.
• McKelvey and Palfrey’s (1995) quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is de-
fined as follows.3 Taking σi(s) to be the probability that mixed strategy σi
assigns to the pure strategy s, given λ > 0, a mixed strategy profile σ is a
3We actually define here a particular instance of QRE called the logit QRE; λ is a free parameter
of this model.
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QRE if, for each player i, σi(s) = e
λEUi(s,σ−i)
∑
s′
i
∈Si
e
λEUi(s
′
i
,σ−i)
.
To see that QRE does not describe human behaviour well in social dilem-
mas, observe that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for all choices of parameters
b and c in the game, all choices of the parameter λ, all players i, and all
(mixed) strategies s−i of player −i, we have EUi(C, s−i) < EUi(D, s−i).
Consequently, whatever the QRE σ is, we must have σi(C) < 12 < σi(D),
that is, QRE predicts that the degree of cooperation can never be larger than
50%. However, experiments show that we can increase the benefit-to-cost
ratio so as to reach arbitrarily large degrees of cooperation (close to 80% in
(Capraro, Jordan, and Rand 2014) with b/c = 10).
• Iterated regret minimization (Halpern and Pass 2012) does not make appro-
priate predictions in Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Public Goods game, be-
cause it predicts that if there is a dominant strategy then it will be played,
and in these two games, playing the Nash equilibrium is the unique domi-
nant strategy.
• Capraro’s (2013) notion of cooperative equilibrium, while correctly pre-
dicting the effects of the size of the group on cooperation in the Bertrand
Competition and the Public Goods game (Barcelo and Capraro 2014), fails
to predict the negative effect of the price floor on cooperation in the Bertrand
Competition.
• Rong and Halpern’s (2013) notion of cooperative equilibrium (which is dif-
ferent from that of Capraro (2013)) focuses on 2-player games. However, the
definition for games with greater than 2 players does not predict the decrease
in cooperation as N increases in Bertrand Competition, nor the increase as
N increases in the Public Goods Game.
The one approach besides ours that we are aware of that obtains all the regularities
discussed above is that of Charness and Rabin (2002). Charness and Rabin, like
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), assume that agents play a Nash equilibrium of a modified
game, where players care not only about their personal material payoff, but also
about the social welfare and the outcome of the least fortunate person. Specifically,
player i’s utility is assumed to be (1−aCRi )ui(s)+aCRi (bCRi minj=1,...,N uj(s)+
(1 − bCRi )
∑N
j=1 uj(s)). Assuming, as in our model, that agents believe that other
players either cooperate or defect and that they cooperate with probability β, then
it is not hard to see that Charness and Rabin (2002) also predict all the regularities
that we have been considering.
Although it seems difficult to distinguish our model from that of Charness and
Rabin (2002) if we consider only social dilemmas, they are distinguishable if we
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look at other settings and take into account the other reason we mentioned for
translucency: that other people in their social group might discover how they acted.
We can easily capture this in the framework we have been considering by doubling
the number of agents; for each player i, we add another player i∗ that represent’s
i’s social network. Player i∗ can play only two actions: n (for “did not observe
player i’s action) and o (for “observed player i’s action”).4 The payoffs of these
new players are irrelevant. Player i’s payoff depends on the action of player i∗,
but not on the actions of player j∗ for j∗ 6= i∗. Now player i must have a prior
probability γi about whether his action will be observed; in a social dilemma, this
probability might increase to γ′i ≥ γi if he intends to cooperate but instead deviates
and defects. It should be clear that, even if γ′i = γi, if we assume that player i’s
utilities are significantly lower if his non-cooperative action is observed, with this
framework we would get qualitatively similar results for social dilemmas to the
ones that we have already obtained.
The advantage of taking into account what your social group thinks is that it can
be applied even to single-player games like the Dictator Game (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986).
To do so, we would need to think about what a player’s utility would be if his so-
cial group knew the extent to which he shared the pot. But it should be clear that
reasonable assumptions here would lead to some degree of sharing.
While this would still not distinguish our predictions from those of the Charness-
Rabin model, there is a variant of the Dictator Game considered by Capraro (2014)
that does allow us to distinguish between the two. In this game, there are only two
possible allocations of money: either the agent gets x and the other players gets
−x, or the other player gets x and the agent gets −x. In this game, the Charness-
Rabin approach would predict that the agent will choose to keep the x. But the
translucency approach would allow that there would be types of agents who would
think that their social group would approve of them giving away x, so, if the action
was observed by their social group, they would get high utility by giving away x.
And, indeed, Capraro’s results show that a significant fraction (25%) of people do
choose to give away x.
Of course, we do not have to assume α > 0 to get cooperation in social dilem-
mas such as Traveler’s Dilemma or Bertrand Competition. But we do if we want
to consider what we believe is the appropriate equilibrium notion. Suppose that ra-
tional players are chosen at random from a population and play a social dilemma.
Players will, of course, then update their beliefs about the likelihood of seeing co-
operation, and perhaps change their strategy as a consequence. Will these beliefs
stabilize and the strategies played stabilize? By stability here, we mean that (1)
4Alternatively, we could take player i’s payoff to depend on the state of the world, where the state
would model whether or not player i’s action was observed.
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players are all best responding to their beliefs, and (2) players’ beliefs about the
strategies played by others are correct: if player i ascribes probability p to player
j playing a strategy sj , then in fact a proportion p of players in the population
play sj . We have deliberately been fuzzy here about whether we mean best re-
sponse in the sense of Definition 2.1 or Definition 2.2. If we use Definition 2.1 (or,
equivalently use Definition 2.2 and take α = 0), then it is easy to see (and well
known) that the only way that this can happen is if the distribution of strategies
played by the players represents a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. On the other
hand, if α > 0 and we use Definition 2.2, then we can have stable beliefs that
accurately reflect the strategies used and have cooperation (in all the other social
dilemmas that we have studied). We make this precise in the appendix using the
framework of Halpern and Pass (2013), by defining a notion of translucent equi-
librium. Roughly speaking, we construct a model where, at all states, players are
translucently rational (so we have common belief of translucent rationality), the
strategies used are common knowledge, and we nevertheless have cooperation at
some states. Propositions 4.1–4.4 play a key role in this construction; indeed, as
long as the strategies used satisfy the constraints imposed by these results, we get
a translucent equilibrium.
We have not focused on translucent equilibrium here in the main text because it
makes strong assumptions about players’ rationality and beliefs (e.g., it implicitly
assumes common belief of translucent rationality). We do not need such strong
assumptions for our results.
A Translucent equilibrium
In the main text of this paper we have described how cooperation can be rational if
players are translucent, that is, if they believe that if they switch from one strategy
to another, the fact that they choose to switch may be visible to the other players.
In this appendix, we show how to use counterfactual structures to define a notion
of equilibrium with translucent players and we observe that rationality of cooper-
ation shown in the main text corresponds to having a mixed strategy translucent
equilibrium, where cooperation is played with non-zero probability. We start by
reviewing the relevant definitions from (Halpern and Pass 2013).
A.1 Game theory with translucent players
Let G = G(P, S, u) be a (finite) normal form game, where P = {1, . . . , N} is the
set of players, each of which has finite pure strategy set Si and utility function ui.
16
Definition A.1. A finite counterfactual structure appropriate for the game G is a
tuple M = (Ω, s, f,PR1, . . . ,PRN ), where:
• Ω is a finite space of states;
• s : Ω → S is the function that associates to each state ω the strategy profile
that is supposed to be played at ω;
• f is the closest-state function, which describes what would happen if player
i switched strategy to s′i at state ω. Thus, f : Ω× P × Si → Ω has to verify
the following properties:
CS1. si(f(ω, i, s′)) = s′i;
CS2. f(ω, i, si(ω)) = ω.
Property CS1 assures that, at state f(ω, i, s′i), player i plays s′i, and Prop-
erty CS2 assures that the state does not change if player i does not change
strategy.
• PRi are player i’s beliefs, which depends on the state i is reasoning about.
Specifically, for each ω ∈ Ω, PRi(ω) is a probability measure on Ω satisfy-
ing the following properties:
PR1. PRi(ω)({ω′ ∈ Ω : si(ω′) = si(ω)}) = 1 (where si(ω) denotes player
i’s strategy in s(ω));
PR2. PRi(ω)({ω′ ∈ Ω : PRi(ω′) = PRi(ω)}) = 1.
These assumptions guarantee that player i assigns probability 1 to his actual
strategy and beliefs. ⊓⊔
We can now define i’s beliefs at ω if he were to switch to strategy s′. Intuitively,
if he were to switch to strategy s′ at ω, the probability that i would assign to state
ω′ is the sum of the probabilities that he assigns to all the states ω′′ such that he
believes that he would move from ω′′ to ω′ if he used strategy s′. Thus we define
PRi,s′(ω)(ω
′) :=
∑
{ω′′:f(ω′′,i,s′)=ω′}
PRi(ω)(ω
′′).
We define the expected utility of player i at state ω in the usual way as the sum
of the product of his expected utility of the strategy profile played at each state ω′
and the probability of ω′: EU i(ω) =
∑
ω′∈Ω PRi(ω)(ω
′)ui(si(ω), s−i(ω
′)).5
5Given a profile t = (t1, . . . , tN), as usual, we define t−i = (t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tN ).
We extend this notation in the obvious way to functions like s, so that, for example, s−i(ω) =
(s1(ω), . . . , si−1(ω), si+1(ω), . . . , sn(ω)).
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Now we define i’s expected utility at ω if he were to switch to s′. The usual
way to do so is to simply replace i’s actual strategy at ω by s′ at all states, keeping
the strategies of the other players the same; that is,∑
ω′∈Ω
PRi(ω)(ω
′)ui(s
′, s−i(ω
′)).
In this definition, player i’s beliefs about the strategies that the other players are
using do not change when he switches from si(ω) to s′. The key point of coun-
terfactual structures is that these beliefs may well change. Thus, we define i’s
expected utility at ω if he switches to s′ as
EU i(ω, s
′) =
∑
ω′∈Ω
PRi,s′(ω)(ω
′)ui(s
′, s−i(ω
′)).
Finally, we can define rationality in counterfactual structures using these no-
tions:
Definition A.2. Player i is rational at state ω if, for all s′ ∈ Si,
EU i(ω) ≥ EU i(ω, s
′).
⊓⊔
A.2 Translucent equilibrium
In this section, we define translucent equilibrium and we observe that the results
reported in the main text imply that social dilemmas have a counterfactual struc-
ture according to which each player plays, in equilibrium, his part of the welfare
maximizing strategy with non-zero probability.
We start with some preliminary notation. Given a probability measure τ on
a finite set T , let supp(τ) denote the support of τ , that is, supp(τ) = {t ∈ T :
τ(t) 6= 0}. Given a mixed strategy profile σ, note that σ−i can can be viewed as
a probability on S−i, where σ−i(s−i) =
∏
j 6=i σj(sj). Similarly σ can be viewed
as a probability measure on S. In the sequel, we view σ−i and σ as probability
measures without further comment (and so talk about their support).
Definition A.3. A strategy profile σ in a game G is translucent equilibrium in a
counterfactual structure M = (Ω, s, f,PR1, . . . ,PRN ) appropriate for G if there
exists a subset Ω′ ⊆ Ω such that, for each state ω in Ω′, the following properties
hold:
TE1. s(ω) ∈ supp(σ);
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TE2. supp(PRi(ω)) ⊆ Ω′;
TE3. s−i(PRi(ω)) = σ−i (i.e., for each strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i, we have
σ−i(s−i) = PRi(ω)({ω
′ : s−i(ω
′) = s−i})).
TE4. each player is rational at ω.
The mixed strategy profile σ is a translucent equilibrium of G if there exists a coun-
terfactual structure M appropriate for G such that σ is a translucent equilibrium in
M . ⊓⊔
Intuitively, σ is a translucent equilibrium in M if, for each strategy si in the
support of σi, the expected utility of playing si given that other players are playing
according to σ−i is at least as good as switching to some other strategy s′i, given
what i would believe about what strategies the other players are playing if he were
to switch to s′i.
This notion of translucent equilibrium is closely related to a condition called IR
(for individually rational) by Halpern and Pass (2013). The main difference is that
Halpern and Pass considered only pure strategy profiles; we allow mixed-strategy
profiles here. We discuss the relationship between the notions at greater length in
Section A.3.
A.3 Characterization of translucent equilibria
While it is easy to see that every Nash equilibrium is a translucent equilibrium
(see Proposition A.4), the converse is far from true. As we show, for example,
cooperation can be an equilibrium in social dilemmas (see below and Section A.4).
In this section, we provide a characterization of translucent equilibria that will
prove useful when discussing social dilemmas.
Proposition A.4. Every Nash equilibrium of G is a translucent equilibrium.
Proof. Given a Nash equilibrium σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), consider the following coun-
terfactual structure Mσ = (Ω, s, f,PR1, . . . ,PRN ):
• Ω is the set of strategy profiles in the support of σ;
• s(s) = s;
• PRi(si, s−i)(s
′
i, s
′
−i) =
{
0 if s′i 6= si
σ−i(s
′
−i) if s′i = si;
• f((si, s−i), i, s
′) = (s′, s−i).
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It is easy to check that σ is a translucent equilibrium in Mσ; we simply take
Ω′ = Ω. The fact that f is an “opaque” closest-state function, which is not affected
by the strategy used by players, means that rationality in M reduces to the standard
definition of rationality. We leave details to the reader.
Although the fact that we can consider arbitrary counterfactual structures (ap-
propriate for G) means that many strategy profiles are translucent equilibria, the
notion of translucent equilibrium has some bite. For example, the strategy profile
(C,D), where player 1 cooperates and player 2 defects, is not a translucent equilib-
rium in Prisoner’s Dilemma: if player 1 believes that player 2 is playing defecting
with probability 1, there are no beliefs that 1 could have that would justify cooper-
ation. However, as we shall see, both (C,C) and (D,D) are translucent equilibria.
This follows from the characterization of translucent equilibrium that we now give.
Definition A.5. A mixed-strategy profile σ in G is coherent if for all players i ∈ P ,
all si ∈ supp(σi), and all s′i ∈ Si, there is s′−i ∈ S−i such that
ui(si, σ−i) ≥ ui(s
′)
(where, of course, ui(si, σ−i) =
∑
s′′
−i∈S
′
−i
σ−i(s
′′
−i)ui(si, s
′′
−i)). ⊓⊔
That is, σ is coherent if, for all pure strategies for player i in the support of σi,
if i’s belief about the strategies being played by the other players is given by σ−i,
there is no obviously better strategy that i can switch to in the weak sense that, if
i contemplates switching to s′i, there are beliefs that i could have about the other
players (namely, that they would definitely play s′−i in this case) that would make
switching to s′i better than sticking with si.
It is easy to see that (C,C) and (D,D) in Prisoner’s Dilemma are both coher-
ent; on the other hand, (C,D) is not.
Halpern and Pass (2013) define a pure strategy profile to be individually ratio-
nal if it is coherent. Definition A.5 extends individual rationality to mixed strate-
gies. Halpern and Pass prove that a pure strategy profile is individually rational if
there is a model where it is commonly known that σ is played and there is common
belief of rationality. The definition of translucent equilibrium can be seen as the
generalization of this characterization of IR to mixed strategies. As the following
theorem shows, we get an analogous representation.
Theorem A.6. The mixed strategy profile σ of game G is coherent iff σ is a translu-
cent equilibrium of G.
Proof. Let σ be a coherent strategy profile in G. We construct a counterfactual
structure M = (Ω, s, f,PR1, . . . ,PRN ) as follows:
20
• Ω = S;
• s(s) = s;
• PRi(ω)(ω
′) =


1 if ω /∈ supp(σi), ω = ω′
0 if ω /∈ supp(σi), ω 6= ω′
σ−i(s−i(ω
′)) if ω ∈ supp(σi), si(ω′) = si(ω)
0 if ω ∈ supp(σi), si(ω′) 6= si(ω);
• f(ω, i, s′i) =


(s′i, s−i(ω)) if ω /∈ supp(σi)
ω if ω ∈ supp(σi), s′i = si(ω)
(s′i, s
′
−i) if ω ∈ supp(σi), s′i 6= si(ω), where s′i is a
strategy such that ui(si(ω), σ−i) ≥ ui(s′);
such a strategy is guaranteed to exist since
σ is coherent.
We first show that M is a finite counterfactual structure appropriate for G; in
particular, PRi satisfies PR1 and PR2 and f satisfies CS1 and CS2. For PR1 and
PR2, there are two cases. If ω /∈ supp(σ), then PRi(ω)(ω) = 1, so PR1 and PR2
clearly hold. If ω /∈ supp(ω), then PRi(ω)(ω) > 0 iff si(ω) = si(ω′). More-
over, if si(ω) = si(ω′), then it is immediate from the definition that PRi(ω) =
PRi(ω
′), so PR2. holds. That CS1 and CS2 hold is immediate from the definition
of f .
To show that σ is a translucent equilibrium in M , let Ω′ = supp(σ). For each
state ω ∈ Ω′, TE1 clearly holds. Note that if ω ∈ supp(σ), then PRi(ω) =
(si(ω), σ−i(ω)) (identifying the strategy profile with a probability measure), so
TE2 and TE3 clearly hold. It remains to show that TE4 holds, that is, that every
player is rational at every state ω ∈ Ω′.
Thus, we must show that EU i(ω) ≥ EU (ω, s∗i ) for all s∗i ∈ Si. Note that
EU i(ω) =
∑
ω′∈Ω PRi(ω)(ω
′)ui(si(ω), s−i(ω
′))
=
∑
{ω′∈Ω:si(ω′)=si(ω)}
σ−i(s−i(ω
′))ui(si(ω), s−i(ω
′))
=
∑
s′′
−i∈S−i
ui(si(ω), s
′′
−i)
= ui(si(ω), σ−i).
By definition,
EU i(ω, s
∗
i ) =
∑
ω′∈Ω
PRi,s∗i (ω)(ω
′)ui(s
∗
i , s−i(ω
′))
and
PRi,s′(ω)(ω
′) =
∑
{ω′′:f(ω′′,i,s′)=ω′}
PRi(ω)(ω
′′).
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Now if s∗i = si(ω), then f(ω, i, s∗i ). In this case, it is easy to check thatPRi,s∗i (ω) =
PRi(ω), so EU i(ω, s
∗
i ) = EU i(ω) = EU i(si, σ−i), and TE4 clearly holds. On
the other hand, if s∗i 6= si(ω), then
EU i(ω, s
∗
i ) =
∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
{ω′′:f(ω′′,i,s∗i )=ω
′}PRi(ω)(ω
′′)ui(s
∗
i , s−i(ω
′))
=
∑
{ω′∈Ω:si(ω′)=s∗i }
∑
{ω′′:f(ω′′,i,s∗i )=ω
′, si(ω′′)=si(ω)}
σ−i(ω
′′)ui(s
∗
i , s−i(ω
′))
=
∑
{ω′∈Ω:si(ω′)=s∗i }
∑
{ω′′:f(ω′′,i,s∗i )=ω
′, si(ω′′)=si(ω)}
σ−i(ω
′′)ui(f(ω
′′, i, s∗i )).
By definition, ui(f(ω′′, i, s∗i )) ≤ ui(si(ω′′), σ−i) = ui(si(ω), σ−i). Thus,
EU i(ω, s
∗
i ) ≤
∑
{ω′∈Ω:si(ω′)=s∗i }
∑
{ω′′:f(ω′′,i,s∗i )=ω
′, si(ω′′)=si(ω)}
σ−i(ω
′′)ui(si(ω), σ−i)
= ui(si(ω), σ−i)
∑
{ω′∈Ω:si(ω′)=s∗i }
∑
{ω′′:f(ω′′,i,s∗i )=ω
′, si(ω′′)=si(ω)}
σ−i(ω
′′)
= ui(si(ω), σ−i).
This completes the proof that TE4 holds, and the proof of the “only if” direction
of the argument
The “if” is actually much simpler. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that σ is
not coherent. Then there is a player i and a strategy si ∈ supp(σi) such that for all
s′−i ∈ Si, we have ui(si, σ−i) < ui(s′). It follows that, for all counterfactual struc-
tures M , no matter what the beliefs and the closest-state functions are in M , it is
always strictly profitable for player i to switch strategy from si to s′i. Consequently,
i is not rational at a state ω such that si(ω) = si, contradicting TE4.
A.4 Translucent equilibrium in social dilemmas
As we now show, our characterizations of Propositions 4.1–4.4 can be used to pro-
vide conditions on when translucent equilibrium exists in these social dilemmas.
We start our analysis with Prisoner’s Dilemma. We capture the assumption
that β is the probability of cooperation, and that players either cooperate or de-
fect, by assuming that players follow a mixed strategy where they cooperate with
probability β and defect with probability 1− β.
Proposition A.7. (β1C+(1−β1)D,β2C+(1−β2)D) is a translucent equilibrium
of Prisoner’s dilemma iff βib ≥ c, for i = 1, 2, or β1 = β2 = 0.
Proof. Suppose that (β1C + (1 − β1)D,β2C + (1 − β2)D). If β1 > 0, then by
Theorem A.6, it easily follows we must have u1(C, β2C+(1−β2)D) ≥ u1(D,D).
Thus, we must have β2(b − c) + (1 − β2)(−c) ≥ 0; equivalently, β2b ≥ c. Note
that since c > 0, this means that we must have β2 > 0. Similarly, if β2 > 0, then
β1b ≥ c. By Theorem A.4, (D,D) is a translucent equilibrium, since it is a Nash
equilibrium. Thus, either βib ≥ c for i = 1, 2 or β1 = β2 = 0.
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Conversely, if βib ≥ c for i = 1, 2, then it again easily follows from Theo-
rem A.6 that (β1C + (1 − β1)D,β2C + (1 − β2)D) is a translucent equilibrium.
As we have observed, (D,D) (the case that β1 = β2 = 0) is also a translucent
equilibrium.
Proposition A.7 is not all that interesting, since it does not take into account a
player’s beliefs regarding translucency. The following definition is a step towards
doing this. Suppose that M is counterfactual structure appropriate for a social
dilemma Γ. Player i has type αi in M if, at each state ω in M , player i believes
that if he intends to cooperate in ω and deviates from that, then each other agent
will independently realize this with probability αi and will defect. Formally, this
means that, at each state ω in M , we have
• if si(ω) = sWi (i.e., i is cooperating in ω by playing his component of the
social-welfare maximing strategy profile), then, for each J ⊆ P \ {i}, we
have PRi(ω)({ω′ : f(ω′, i, sNi ) = ω′′, sj(ω′) = sCj , sj(ω′′) = sNj ,∀j ∈
J}) = α
|J |
i PRi(ω){ω
′ : sj(ω
′) = sCj ,∀j ∈ J}).
Proposition A.8. (β1C+(1−β1)D,β2C+(1−β2)D) is a translucent equilibrium
of the Prisoner’s dilemma in a structure where player i has type αi if and only if
β1 = β2 = 0 or αiβ3−ib ≥ c for i ≥ 1, 2.
Proof. Suppose that αiβ3−ib ≥ c for i = 1, 2 or β1 = β2 = 0. We show that
(β1C + (1 − β1)D,β2C + (1 − β2)D) is a translucent equilibrium in a struc-
ture where player i has type αi. Consider the counterfactual structure M(α1, α2)
defined as follows
• Ω = {C,D} × {0, 1}2. (The second component of the state, which is an
element of {0, 1}2, is used to determine the closest-state function. Roughly
speaking, if vj = 1, then player j learns about a deviation if there is one; if
vj = 0, he does not.)
• s((s, v)) = s.
• f((s, v), i, s∗i ) =


(s, v) if si = s∗i ,
(s′, v) if si 6= s∗i , where s′i = s∗i and for j 6= i,
s′j = sj if vj = 0 and s′j = sNj if vj = 1.
Thus, if player i changes strategy from si to s′i, s′i 6= si, then each other
player j either deviates to his component of the Nash equilibrium or contin-
ues with his current strategy, depending on whether vj is 0 or 1. Roughly
speaking, he switches to his component of the Nash equilibrium if he learns
about a deviation (i.e., if vj = 1).
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• PRi(s, v)(s
′, v′) =
{
0 if si 6= s′i, or vi 6= v′i,
σ3−i(s3−i)pii(v3−i) if s = s′,
where
σ3−i is the distribution on strategies that puts probability β3−i on C and
probability 1 − β3−i on D, while pii is the distribution that puts probability
αi on 1 and probability 1 − αi on 0. Thus, if s = s′, then the probability
of the v′ component is determined by assuming that the other player (3 − i)
independently learns about a deviation by i with probability αi.
Clearly, M(α1, α2) is a structure where player i has type αi, for i = 1, 2. We
claim that (β1C + (1 − β1)D,β2C + (1 − β2)D) is a translucent equilibrium in
the counterfactual structure M(α1, α2).
There are two cases. If β1 = β2 = 0, then let Ω′ consist of all states of the
form ((D,D), v). It is easy to check that TE1–4 hold. If αiβ3−ib ≥ c for i ≥ 1, 2,
let Ω′ = Ω. It is immediate that TE1, TE2, and TE3 hold. Since αiβ3−ib ≥ c, it
follows from Proposition 4.1 that player i is rational at each state in Ω; thus, TE4
holds.
For the converse, suppose that M is a structure where player i has type αi, for
i = 1, 2, and (β1C +(1−β1)D,β2C +(1−β2)D) is a translucent equilibrium in
M . If it is not the case that either β1 = β2 = 0 or αiβ3−ib ≥ c for i = 1, 2, without
loss of generality we can assume that β1 > 0 and that α1β2b < c. Let ω be a state in
the set Ω′ where player 1 cooperates. Since player 1 must be rational at Ω′, we must
have u1(C, β2C+(1−β2)D) ≥ ((1−β2)+α1β2)u1(D,D)+(1−α1)β2u1(D,C).
Simple calculations show that this inequality holds iff β2(b− c)+ (1−β2)(−c) ≥
(1− α1)β2b or, equivalently, α1β2b ≥ c. This gives the desired contradiction.
The following propositions can be proved in a similar fashion. We leave details
to the reader.
Proposition A.9. (β1H+(1−β1)L, β2H+(1−β2)L) is a translucent equilibrium
of the Traveler’s dilemma if and only if b ≤ (H−L)βi1−βi , for i = 1, 2, or β1 = β2 = 0.
⊓⊔
Proposition A.10. (β1H+(1−β1)L, β2H+(1−β2)L) is a translucent equilibrium
of the Traveler’s dilemma in a structure where player i has type αi if and only if
β1 = β2 = 0 or
b ≤


(H−L)β3−i
1−αiβ3−i
if αi ≥ 12
min
(
(H−L)β3−i
1−αiβ3−i
, H−L−11−2αi
)
if αi < 12 .
⊓⊔
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In the following propositions, let C and D denote, respectively, the full con-
tribution and the null contribution in the Public Goods game. Given an N -tuple
(r1, . . . , rN ) of real numbers, r¯−i denotes the average of the numbers rj , with
j 6= i.
Proposition A.11. (β1C + (1 − β1)D, . . . , βNC + (1 − βN )D) is a translucent
equilibrium of the Public Goods game if and only if ρβ¯−i(N − 1) ≥ 1 − ρ for all
i, or βi = 0 for all i. ⊓⊔
Proposition A.12. (β1C + (1 − β1)D, . . . , βNC + (1 − βN )D) is a translucent
equilibrium of the Public Goods game in a structure where player i has type αi if
and only if βi = 0 for all i or αiρβ¯−i ≥ 1− ρ for all i. ⊓⊔
Proposition A.13. (β1H + (1 − β1)L, . . . , βNH + (1 − βN )L) is a translucent
equilibrium of the Bertrand competition if and only if βi = 0 for all i, or
∏
j 6=i βj ≥
L
H
for all i. ⊓⊔
Proposition A.14. (β1H + (1 − β1)L, . . . , βNH + (1 − βN )L) is a translucent
equilibrium of the Bertrand competition in a structure where player i has type αi
if and only if βi = 0 for all i, or
∏
j 6=i βj ≥ f(γi,j, N)LN/H for all i, where
f(γi,j, N) =
∑
J⊆P−{i}(
∏
j∈P−(J∪{i}) γi,j
∏
j∈J(1− γi,j))/(|J |+1) and γi,j =
(1− αi)βj . ⊓⊔
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